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Abstract : This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Report on United
States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from
Mexico (WT/DS282/AB/R 2 November 2005). This dispute concerns the
disciplines imposed by the Anti-Dumping Agreement on WTO Members seeking
to extend their anti-dumping measures beyond the original ﬁve-year period
through a so-called sunset review. Our analysis focuses on the Appellate Body’s
ﬁnding in this case that no causation analysis is required in sunset reviews, and
addresses the AB’s approach towards the legal instrument that provides for the
US policy in terms of sunset reviews, the Sunset Policy Bulletin. We conclude that
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body in this and
other similar cases, imposes only minimal disciplines of a general nature on
Members wishing to extend the anti-dumping measure beyond its original
ﬁve-year period. We argue that the ‘textual’ argument relied on to support this
deferential approach is weak and has resulted in undermining the practical eﬀect
of, what was considered to be, one of the major achievements of the Uruguay
Round Anti-Dumping Agreement: limiting the life span of an anti-dumping
measure to ﬁve years. From an economic perspective, Panels and the Appellate
Body are simply debating the wrong type of questions. The prospective nature
required by a sunset review analysis raises questions such as why exporters
engaged in dumping in the ﬁrst place, and what the conditions of the industry
were so that the dumped imports caused injury. At the moment, sunset reviews
This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) fromMexico (WT/DS282/AB/R 2 November 2005). Thanks to William
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its clients. All remaining errors are our own.
World Trade Review (2008), 7 : 1, 269–298 Printed in the United Kingdom
f Chad P. Bown and Jasper Wauters doi:10.1017/S1474745607003576
269
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745607003576
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
seem adrift as panels and the Appellate Body fail to give guidance to Members on
how to do a more economically sound and informed review.
1. Introduction
This dispute concerns the disciplines imposed by the Anti-dumping (AD)
Agreement on WTO Members seeking to extend their anti-dumping measures
beyond the original ﬁve-year period. In essence, this dispute examines the question
of whether the AD Agreement actually imposes certain substantive disciplines on
authorities when conducting such sunset reviews.
By way of background, the AD Agreement provides for termination of AD
duties after ﬁve years. AD duties can, in principle, remain in place for a period
longer than ﬁve years. In other words, termination of the duty is the rule, and its
continuation is the exception.1 How much longer duties may remain in place
depends on the outcome of successive reviews, called ‘sunset reviews’, in which
authorities examine whether dumping and injury are likely to continue or recur
in case the duty is terminated. The terms continuation and recurrence refer to
two diﬀerent factual situations: the ﬁrst term presupposes that dumping and/or
injury have not ceased to exist during the period of imposition of AD duties ; the
latter presupposes that the opposite has happened during the same period. The
methodology used to demonstrate the likelihood of continuation or recurrence is
not prejudged by the Article 11.3 AD Agreement, which is the only provision in the
AD Agreement that speciﬁcally deals with such sunset reviews.
Mexico claimed that the way the US conducts such sunset reviews is inconsistent
with the AD Agreement. Its complaint related to both US laws and regulations
concerning sunset reviews and the speciﬁc application of such laws in the sunset
review of an anti-dumping duty order imposed by the US on imports of oil-country
tubular goods (OCTG)2 from Mexico and other sources.
The facts
In August 1995, the US issued an anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from a
number of countries including Mexico. The US Department of Commerce
(USDOC), the authority responsible for determining the existence and amount
of dumping in the US, calculated a dumping margin for the largest Mexican
producer (TAMSA), and assigned margins based on this producer’s rate to the
other, non-investigated producers, such as Hylsa. Following the imposition of the
anti-dumping duty, TAMSA stopped exporting to the US and thus was no longer
1 Appellate Body Report,US–Carbon Steel, para. 88. The experience over the last ten years with sunset
reviews has actually been that the extension of the AD measure is the rule rather than the exception.
2 Such goods are used mainly for oil exploration and mining purposes.
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dumping its products into the US. Yearly administrative reviews of the measure
thus led to a zero dumping margin for TAMSA.
In the ‘sunset review’, USDOC and the US International Trade Commission
(USITC), the US authority responsible for determining whether there is injury
to the US domestic industry, examined whether termination of the duty on
Mexican OCTG would be likely to lead to a recurrence or continuation of
dumping and injury. Their conclusion was that it would. The likely dumping
margin to prevail in case of termination of the duty was calculated to be 21.70%, a
ﬁgure that corresponds with the rate calculated in the original investigation, as
amended.
As a result, instead of revoking the anti-dumping duty order on OCTG from
Mexico, the anti-dumping measures were extended for another ﬁve-year period
eﬀective as of 25 July 2001.
Mexico’s claims
Before the Panel, Mexico made a number of claims arguing that the US should
have terminated the duty even before the sunset review in the course of one of
the yearly administrative reviews. In the absence of dumping by the Mexican
exporters, there was no need to maintain the duty ‘in order to oﬀset dumping’.
In any case, according to Mexico, the duty should have been terminated at
the end of the ﬁve-year period, and the US contrary aﬃrmative determination of
likelihood of dumping and injury recurring following expiry of the duty was
ﬂawed.
Mexico’s claims related to the likelihood-of-dumping determination, as well as
the standard for determining likelihood of injury in sunset reviews. With respect to
the speciﬁc USITC determination of likely injury in the case of OCTG imports
from Mexico, Mexico argued that the US failed to comply with a number of the
disciplines set forth in Article 3 AD Agreement on injury, which it considers also
to apply in sunset reviews.3 In particular, Mexico alleged inter alia that the USITC
did not examine all 15 factors of Article 3.4 AD, relied on a cumulative assessment
of imports without legal basis and in a manner inconsistent with Article 3.3,
and did not examine whether the likely injury would be caused by the dumped
imports.
Against the background of this particular OCTG case, Mexico made a number
of claims concerning the legal standards and requirements present in US law and
US practice in respect of sunset reviews, which it considers to be inconsistent with
the AD Agreement. In this respect, an important document challenged was
the USDOC’s Sunset Policy Bulletin in which this USDOC explains how it will
determine the existence of a likelihood of dumping in sunset reviews.
3 According to Mexico, the deﬁnition of the term ‘injury’ in Article 3 and footnote 9 applies
throughout AD Agreement and thus also in respect of a determination of likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of injury under Article 11.3.
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Mexico argued that Section II.A.3 of the US Sunset Policy Bulletin4 (SPB) and
USDOC ‘practice’ in the performance of sunset reviews are inconsistent, ‘as such’
with its obligations under Article 11.3. According to Mexico, it is clear from the
SPB that the US authorities base their determinations on presumptions that
dumping is likely to continue or recur in certain factual situations that are given
decisive weight. The key elements in such factual scenarios are import volumes
and dumping margins. If the situation described in any of the scenarios is met,
likelihood will be found to exist without consideration of other relevant positive
evidence.5 Mexico argued that, by basing its sunset determination on such as-
sumptions, the US is not complying with the obligation of the AD Agreement to
base a sunset review determination on facts and evidence, rather than assumptions.
The United States response
The United States was of the view that nothing in the Agreement requires a WTO
Member to terminate an anti-dumping measure following a ﬁnding of no dumping
in the course of one or more administrative reviews.
The United States disagreed as to the applicability in sunset reviews of the
disciplines of Article 3 AD Agreement relating to a determination of the existence
of injury in original investigations. According to the US, a sunset review is con-
cerned with the determination of the likelihood of recurrence or continuation of
injury as a consequence of the termination of the measure, and because of this
diﬀerent nature and purpose, the disciplines of Article 3 do not apply. In the
absence of a textual basis to import such disciplines into sunset reviews, the US
argued that diﬀerent questions warrant diﬀerent methods of analysis and the
4 Section II.A.3 of the SPB reads in relevant part as follows:
the Department normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping order or termination of
a suspended dumping investigation is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping
where—
(a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis after the issuance of the order or the
suspension agreement, as applicable;
(b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after issuance of the order or the suspension
agreement, as applicable; or
(c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order or the suspension agreement, as
applicable, and import volumes for the subject merchandise declined signiﬁcantly.
The Department recognizes that, in the context of a sunset review of a suspended investigation, the
data relevant to the criteria under paragraphs (a) through (c), above, may not be conclusive with
respect to likelihood. Therefore, the Department may be more likely to entertain good cause
arguments under paragraph II.C in a sunset review of a suspended investigation.
5 This is what had occurred also in the sunset review concerning OCTG from Mexico. The USDOC
concluded that there was a likelihood of dumping because the exports had stopped following the im-
position of the antidumping order. A decline in import volume following the order is one of the factual
scenarios which, according to the SPB, reveals a likelihood of dumping in the future as it allegedly shows
that, without dumping, the exporter cannot sell its products in the US market. Mexico considered that
such a presumption is inconsistent with the AD Agreement’s requirements of making objective examin-
ations based on positive evidence.
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consideration of diﬀerent factors. According to the US, any disciplines that may
apply to sunset reviews are to be found in Article 11.3 AD Agreement. The
US submitted that this implies, for example, that a cumulative assessment of
likely injury of imports from several countries (‘ injury cumulation’), which is not
mentioned in Article 11.3, is not prohibited in sunset reviews. It is permitted as a
practice without the need to comply with the speciﬁc disciplines of Article 3.3 AD
Agreement, as such disciplines apply only to original investigations. Similarly,
there is no textual basis for introducing a requirement to establish a causal link
between likely future dumping and likely future injury.
With respect to the challenge by Mexico of US sunset provisions as such, the
US considered that the SPB cannot be challenged as such before the WTO. In
particular, the US emphasized that the SPB is not a binding legal instrument in US
law and is meant simply as a transparency tool. It cannot require any particular
action and is, therefore, incapable of breaching the US’s obligations under the
AD Agreement. In any case, it argued, the three factual scenarios set forth in the
SPB are not determinative or conclusive and do not require the USDOC to rule
aﬃrmatively on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in any
case in which one of the three criteria of Section II.A.3 of SPB has been satisﬁed.
The USDOC has discretionary authority to examine other evidence and base its
determination on such other evidence. According to the US, the fact that this has
not happened so far does not imply that the authorities lack the discretion to
deviate from the scenarios of the SPB.
2. The Report – Panel and Appellate Body
The challenge of the SPB
The Panel
The Panel ﬁrst examined whether the Sunset Policy Bulletin was indeed a
‘measure ’ that could be challenged through WTO dispute settlement proceedings
and, if so, whether its provisions were inconsistent with the US’s obligations
under the AD Agreement.6 The Panel was of the view that the ﬁrst question had
been answered aﬃrmatively by the Appellate Body in previous cases such as
US – Corrosion Resistant Steel and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews7 ﬁnding that ‘any act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be
6 In this section, we discuss the most important issues addressed by the Panel and the Appellate Body in
respect of Mexico’s claims. An important number of Mexico’s claims were addressed and rejected by the
Panel but were not the subject of an appeal. We therefore did not include them in our discussion. In any
case, most of these claims concerned issues already dealt with in previous sunset review cases and did not
present any novel or systemically important question.
7 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country
Tubular Goods from Argentina (‘US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews ’), WT/DS268/AB/R,
para. 189, adopted 17 December 2004, aﬃrming ﬁnding of the Panel that the SPB is a ‘measure’ subject to
WTO dispute settlement, Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews),
United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods 273
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745607003576
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings’.8 The
Panel further referred to the Appellate Body’s conclusions that any legal instru-
ment under a WTO Member’s law could also be challenged as a measure before a
WTO panel irrespective of the way in which it operates in individual cases.9 As the
Appellate Body was dealing in both cases with the same SPB, the Panel, without
any further ado, reached the conclusion that the SPB was a ‘measure subject to
WTO dispute settlement’.10
With respect to the question of what is required under the AD agreement, the
Panel adopted the ﬁndings of earlier Appellate Body reports that Article 11.3 AD
Agreement requires that a likelihood determination in a sunset review be made ‘on
a suﬃcient factual basis ’. This implies that an investigating authority cannot base
its determination on presumptions, to the exclusion of a full examination of the
factual circumstances.11 The Panel thus concluded that the relevant question to
address was whether the scenarios based on the two factors (i.e., import volumes
and historical dumping margins) are treated as determinative or conclusive, or
merely indicative or probative.12 If the latter was the case, no violation would exist.
The Panel examined the text of the SPB and came to the conclusion that it was
not clear from the text whether the three scenarios based on import volumes and
dumping margins were considered determinative or merely indicative. It thus
decided to examine how the SPB had been applied in the past by the USDOC. In so
doing, the Panel took to heart the warning given by the Appellate Body inUS – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews case that such an analysis could not be
based on ‘mere statistical evidence’. The Panel decided that it would conduct
a qualitative assessment of the evidence before it to see whether the aﬃrmative
determinations were made solely on the basis of one of the scenarios to the
exclusion of other factors, in line with the guidance provided by the Appellate
Body in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews.13
WT/DS268/R, at para. 7.136, adopted 17 December 2004 as modiﬁed by the Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS268/AB/R.
8 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review),
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9 January 2004, para. 81.
9 Ibid., para. 82.
10 Panel Report, 282/R, para. 7.24.
11 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 178, 191.
12 Panel Report, 282/R, para. 7.30.
13 The Panel speciﬁcally recalled the following guidance by the AB in that case that:
in order to objectively assess, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, whether the three factual
scenarios of Section II.A.3 of the SPB are regarded as determinative/conclusive, it is essential to
examine concrete examples of cases where the likelihood determination of continuation or recur-
rence of dumping was based solely on one of the scenarios of Section II.A.3 of the SPB, even though
the probative value of other factors might have outweighed that of the identiﬁed scenario. Such an
examination requires a qualitative assessment of the likelihood determinations in individual cases.
AB Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 209, as referred to in Panel Report,
282/R, para. 7.49.
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Based on its analysis of 232 determinations, it came to the conclusion that
despite the apparent recognition that it may do otherwise, USDOC has consist-
ently based its determinations in sunset reviews exclusively on the scenarios, to the
disregard of other factors. We quote from para. 7.63 of the report:
In summary, our qualitative analysis of USDOC decisions reveals a clear picture.
In almost all cases, USDOC begins with a recitation of the SPB scenarios. In the
simplest cases, the determinations then recite facts ﬁtting one of the scenarios,
and USDOC concludes that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping. In other cases, USDOC seems clearly to have made its decision based
exclusively on the SPB, without giving consideration to other potentially proba-
tive factors in evidence. We consider it telling that some of the determinations
appear to indicate that the USDOC perceives the SPB scenarios as conclusive or
determinative to the extent of obviating any necessity even to admit, let alone
weigh, evidence as to other factors. In a few cases, USDOC appears at the outset
willing to consider whether other factors may be relevant or probative, but does
not ultimately rely on such factors, dismissing them summarily or not discussing
them at all, and basing its ﬁnal determination on evidence ﬁtting the SPB
scenarios. We emphasize that we are not focusing solely on the outcomes in
these sunset reviews, but rather on our qualitative analysis of the determinations,
and what we can discern about USDOC’s decision-making process under-
lying those determinations. We therefore conclude that, despite the apparent
recognition that it may do otherwise, USDOC has consistently based its
determinations in sunset reviews exclusively on the scenarios, to the disregard of
other factors. In our view, the actual determinations made, which in all cases
ultimately conform to the results predicted by the SPB scenarios, belie the
conclusion that USDOC does not consider them as conclusive or determinative in
sunset reviews.
It thus concluded that the SPB established an irrefutable presumption of
aﬃrmative likely dumping in case one of the factual scenarios of the SPB was
found to exist. The Panel found that, as Article 11.3 AD Agreement does not allow
for such irrefutable presumption, Mexico had demonstrated that the SPB is, as
such, inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement.
When it came to the speciﬁc determination of likelihood of dumping in case of
OCTG imports fromMexico, the Panel was of the view that the USDOC, applying
its policy of looking at the three speciﬁc scenarios, based its conclusions entirely on
a decline in import volumes following the imposition of the order, and disregarded
potentially relevant other evidence. Since the Panel was of the view that in a
sunset review under Article 11.3 AD Agreement, an authority must act with an
appropriate degree of diligence and arrive at a reasoned conclusion on the basis of
information gathered as part of a process of reconsideration and examination,14
14 The Panel referred to the view expressed by the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review, paras. 111–115.
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the USDOC determination of likely dumping was considered inconsistent with the
requirements of Article 11.3 AD Agreement.15
The Appellate Body
The United States appealed the Panel’s ﬁnding that Section II.A.3 of the SPB is,
as such, inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, contend-
ing that the Panel failed to correctly apply the applicable legal standard in its
assessment of the consistency of the SPB. It did not appeal the ﬁndings of the Panel
in respect of the speciﬁc case of Mexican OCTG imports.
The Appellate Body upheld the US’s challenge of the Panel’s determination
of inconsistency of the SPB, and overturned the Panel in this respect. The AB
examined the Panel’s analysis and came to the conclusion that it failed to live up to
the standard of a ‘qualitative assessment’ it had set for itself. What the Panel
should have examined, in the AB’s view, was whether, and how relevant and
probative, factors outside the scenarios were considered by the USDOC. As
the nature and extent of the evidence to rebut the presumptions of the scenarios
varies depending on the applicable scenario, a Panel cannot conduct a ‘qualitative
assessment’ without examining how such counterevidence was dealt with. The AB
thus came to the overall conclusion that :
the Panel’s analysis does not reveal that the aﬃrmative determinations, in the
21 speciﬁc cases reviewed by it, were based exclusively on the scenarios to the
disregard of other factors. Nor does the Panel’s review of these cases reveal that
the USDOC’s aﬃrmative determinations were based solely on the SPB scenarios,
when the probative value of other factors might have outweighed that of the
identiﬁed scenarios. Accordingly, we conclude that the Panel did not conduct a
‘qualitative assessment’ of the USDOC’s determination such that the Panel could
properly conclude that the SPB requires the USDOC to treat the factual scenarios
of Section II.A.3 of the SPB as determinative or conclusive.16
Having overturned the Panel’s decision, the AB concluded that the Panel’s
statement of inconsistency of the SPB was ‘moot and of no legal eﬀect ’.17
Likelihood of injury
The Panel
The Panel rejected all of Mexico’s injury-related claims. The Panel considered that
the Article 3 disciplines on ‘ injury’ do not apply to determinations of ‘ likelihood
of injury’ in sunset reviews. It crucially relied on the reasoning of the AB in
15 The Panel noted for example that the USDOC did not rely on information concerning historical
dumping margins, including the information on dumping margins calculated in administrative reviews
during the period of time that the measure had been in place. Nor did USDOC otherwise consider any
evidence relating to the amount of dumping originally found, the basis of that calculation, or whether
changes in the underlying ﬁnancial situation might aﬀect the question of likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of dumping. Panel Report, para. 7.78.
16 Appellate Body Report, para. 209.
17 Appellate Body Report, para. 211.
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US – Corrosion Resistant Steel and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset
Reviews concerning the diﬀerence between original investigations and reviews.
The Panel considered that a determination of injury is not the same as a determi-
nation of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury in a sunset review, and
that, consequently, requirements relevant to a determination of injury are not
necessarily relevant to a determination of continuation or recurrence of injury.
It concluded that an investigating authority is not required to make an injury
determination in a sunset review, and that, therefore, the obligations set out in
Article 3 AD Agreement are not directly applicable in sunset reviews.18 Still, the
Panel added, the provisions of Article 3 governing the determination of injury may
provide useful guidance in the context of the analysis in sunset reviews.19
The Appellate Body
Mexico’s limited appeal of the Panel’s ﬁndings in respect of the applicability of
Article 3 AD Agreement to sunset reviews concerned the Panel’s interpretation
of Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and its failure to address the
‘ inherent’ causation requirements under that Article. Referring to the underlying
principles in the Anti-Dumping Agreement 20 and Article VI of the GATT 1994,
Mexico argued that, even assuming that Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement (dealing with causation) does not apply directly to sunset reviews,
the Panel failed to recognize the ‘ inherent’ obligation to establish a causal link
between likely dumping and likely injury in a sunset review determination under
Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The AB rejected Mexico’s argument of an inherent requirement to conduct a
causation analysis under Article 11.3 AD Agreement. On the one hand, the AB
agreed withMexico that the existence of a causal link between dumping and injury
to the domestic industry is fundamental to the imposition and maintenance of an
anti-dumping duty under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the words of the AB:
an anti-dumping duty can be imposed and maintained only if the dumping
(as properly established) causes injury to the domestic industry. Absent injury to
the domestic industry, the rationale for either imposing the duty in the ﬁrst place,
or maintaining it at any time after its imposition, does not exist.21
On the other hand, the AB held the view that because the ‘review’ contemplated
in Article 11.3 AD Agreement is a ‘distinct ’ process with a ‘diﬀerent’ purpose
from the original investigation, a causal link between dumping and injury is not
required to be established anew in a sunset review. The AB considered that in a
sunset review, the nexus to be demonstrated is between ‘the expiry of the duty’ on
18 Panel Report, para. 7.117.
19 The Panel further rejected all of Mexico’s arguments that the USITC did not base its ‘ likelihood of
injury’ determination on a suﬃcient factual basis. It considered that the USITC determination was based
on positive evidence and supported by adequate reasoning.
20 Mexico referred to Articles 1, 3, 11.1, and 18.1 of the AD Agreement in particular.
21 Appellate Body Report, para. 117.
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the one hand, and the likelihood of ‘continuation or recurrence of dumping and
injury’ on the other hand. What is required under Article 11.3 is the eﬀect of the
expiry of the duty on the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and
injury.22 The AB did not consider that the requirement of establishing a causal link
between likely dumping and likely injury necessarily ﬂows into that Article from
other provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According
to the AB, ‘adding such a requirement would have the eﬀect of converting the
sunset review into an original investigation, which cannot be justiﬁed’.23 The AB
hastened to add that this did not imply that the causal link between dumping and
injury envisaged by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement was severed in a sunset review. It would only mean that reestablishing
such a link is not required, as a matter of legal obligation, in a sunset review.24
Cumulation
The Panel
The Panel did not accept Mexico’s arguments that, in sunset reviews, it is not
permissible to cumulatively assess the eﬀects of imports from various countries
subject to the order. Neither did it consider convincing Mexico’s alternative
argument that in case such cumulation were permitted, the same disciplines as
are imposed by Article 3.3 AD Agreement in respect of cumulation in original
investigations would necessarily also apply in a sunset review context.
The Panel was of the view that the silence of the AD Agreement on the question
of cumulation in sunset reviews is properly understood to mean that cumulation is
permitted in sunset reviews. It referred to the ﬁnding of the Appellate Body in
US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, which dealt with the exact
same question. In that case, the AB concluded that cumulation is permitted in
sunset reviews and that, since the disciplines of Article 3.3 AD Agreement are
limited to original investigations, such disciplines do not apply in sunset reviews.
The Appellate Body
On appeal, Mexico argued that, irrespective of whether the speciﬁc obligations of
Article 3.3 AD Agreement applied to sunset reviews, the USITC was under an
obligation to ensure that cumulation was appropriate in light of the conditions
of competition. It argued that, to do that, the USITC was required to make a
threshold ﬁnding that the subject imports would be simultaneously present in the
US market. According to Mexico, the Panel erred in declining to examine and
make ﬁndings on this issue. In this respect, Mexico argued that nowhere in the
USITC’s analysis was there positive evidence demonstrating that imports from
22 Any such determinations under Article 11.3 must rest on a ‘suﬃcient factual basis’ that allows the
investigating authority to draw ‘reasoned and adequate conclusions’. See, for example, Appellate Body
Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 311.
23 Appellate Body Report, para. 123.
24 Appellate Body Report, para. 124.
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Mexico, and imports from Argentina, Italy, Korea, and Japan would be present in
the United States market at the same time if the order were revoked. In any case,
Mexico was of the view that having decided to cumulate Mexican imports with
imports from four other countries, the USITC was required to do so consistently
with the requirements of Article 3.3, regardless of whether that provision applies
directly to sunset reviews.
The AB disagreed both with respect to the inherent ‘simultaneous presence’
argument and with respect to the general applicability of the disciplines of
Article 3.3.
The AB failed to see why the USITC was required, under Article 11.3 AD
Agreement, to follow the speciﬁc step of making a ‘threshold ﬁnding’ on the
simultaneous presence of subject imports before resorting to cumulation,25 given
the fact that Article 11.3 does not prescribe any particular methodology with
respect to cumulation in sunset reviews.26
In addition, the AB clearly established the fact that the disciplines of Article 3.3
relating to cumulation in original investigations do not apply per se in sunset
reviews under Article 11.3. In its typical fashion, the AB added the following
caveat :
We do not, however, suggest that, when an authority chooses to cumulate
imports in a likelihood-of-injury determination under Article 11.3, it is never
necessary for it to determine whether such a cumulative assessment is appropriate
in the light of the conditions of competition in the market place. In particular
cases, a cumulative assessment of the eﬀects of the imports may be found to be
inappropriate and, therefore, inconsistent with the fundamental requirement that
a determination rest on a suﬃcient factual basis and reasoned and adequate
conclusions.27 However, this fundamental requirement derives from the
obligations under Article 11.3 itself, and not from the conditions speciﬁed in
Article 3.3.28
25 Appellate Body Report, para. 152.
26 Typically, the AB oﬀered the following attenuation of its statement that no such determination of
simultaneous presence is required:
This is not to say that it is never necessary for an investigating authority, performing a cumulative
analysis of injury caused by imports from all sources, to examine whether imports are ‘ in the
market together and competing against each other. ’ In order to arrive at a reasoned and adequate
conclusion, an examination of whether imports are in the market together and competing against
each other may, in certain cases, be needed in a likelihood-of-injury determination where an in-
vestigating authority chooses to cumulate the imports from several countries. But the need for such
an examination ﬂows from the particular facts and circumstances of a given case and not from a
legal requirement under Article 11.3.
Appellate Body Report, para. 153.
27 See Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 284.
28 Appellate Body Report, para. 171.
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3. Analysis
Legal analysis
The case discussed in this report was the fourth and so far ﬁnal one dealing with
sunset reviews, and, not surprisingly, built on a number of such previous Panel and
Appellate Body reports. We will, therefore, ﬁrst provide a quick overview of the
basic conclusions to draw from the sunset case law to date. Thereafter, we will
brieﬂy comment on the Appellate Body’s ﬁnding in this case that no causation
analysis is required in sunset reviews. Third, we address the AB’s analysis of the
Panel’s decision in respect of the Sunset Policy Bulletin.
Sunset reviews – an empty box?
Only one provision of the AD Agreement explicitly deals with sunset reviews,
Article 11.3 AD Agreement. It does not say much but simply sets forth two key
principles : (1) that anti-dumping duties are to be terminated after ﬁve years ; and
(2) that by way of exception, duties may remain in place for a longer period of time
if it is determined in a review that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. That is all that the text of the
AD Agreement provides for in respect of sunset reviews.29 All the sunset disputes
dealt with by WTO panels and the AB revolved around the question whether
some of the more detailed requirements about dumping and injury, as reﬂected in
various provisions of the AD Agreement, as well as many of the procedural rules
developed with respect to original investigations also apply to sunset reviews.
The commonsense argument is clear. A sunset review is more or less like a new
investigation, and may take up to one year to conclude; it is about dumping and
injury, terms deﬁned in Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement ; an investigation is
required, and the Agreement explicitly imposes respect for the procedural and
evidentiary safeguards of original investigations also in the conduct of such review
investigations. While the outcome of a review is diﬀerent from the outcome of an
original investigation, i.e. whether dumping and injury would be likely to recur
rather than whether dumping and injury exist, the concepts used and the process
followed are very similar. Nevertheless, the text of Article 11.3 does not cross-
reference to these provisions of the AD Agreement in which dumping and injury
are detailed. It does not contain any disciplines in terms of methodology to follow
in sunset reviews. So the choice before the WTO panels and the AB was funda-
mentally the following: do we follow a strict textual approach or do we prefer
a contextual approach based on common sense. The latter approach would in-
evitably lead to the introduction of a number of disciplines in sunset reviews, and
thus limit the discretion of the investigating authority. Confronted with that choice
on a number of occasions, the AB consistently opted for the strict textual approach
and preserved to the maximum extent possible the investigating authority’s
29 Article 11.4 adds that insofar as procedure and evidence are concerned, everything that was pro-
vided for with respect to original investigations also applies to reviews such as a sunset review.
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discretionary authority in extending anti-dumping measures beyond the envisaged
maximum period of ﬁve years.
The argument oﬀered by the AB was basically that sunset reviews and original
investigations are diﬀerent processes with a diﬀerent purpose,30 to which diﬀerent
rules apply. The rules and disciplines for making a determination of dumping and
injury that apply in original investigations, are not applicable as such in sunset
reviews.31 In respect of the likelihood-of-injury determination, the AB, in its report
on US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, was of the view that no
injury examination in the sense of Article 3 AD Agreement is required and that,
therefore, the obligations set out in Article 3 do not apply in sunset reviews.32 The
same approach governed the likelihood of dumping determination. The AB was of
the view that the silence on the methodology for determining likelihood of
dumping in Article 11.3 suggests that no obligation is imposed on investigating
authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in a sunset review. This is so
because, in a sunset review, dumping margins may well be relevant, but will not
necessarily be conclusive of whether the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead
to continuation or recurrence of dumping. In an original investigation, however,
a positive margin determination is a necessary condition for the imposition of a
measure.33
It appeared that by taking this approach the Appellate Body was voiding of all
meaning the need to conduct a sunset review. The hard-fought rule that duties
could not stay in place forever, but were to be terminated after ﬁve years, becomes
meaningless. If no disciplines apply to sunset reviews, such reviews become a
formality; as has happened in practice in certain countries, an anti-dumping duty
will in eﬀect be extended quasi-automatically every ﬁve years.
Obviously concerned about this outcome, the AB decided to attenuate its hard
line: it started to read things into a couple of the terms that appear in Article 11.3
and on that basis imposed some basic general limitations on an authority’s
freedom. While it refused to read the terms ‘dumping’ and ‘injury’ in context, the
terms ‘review’ and ‘determination’ were interpreted as if they operated like
Russian dolls containing a number of diﬀerent obligations.
Based on the fact that a sunset ‘review’ requires a ‘determination’ of likely
dumping and injury, the primary obligation the AB imposed on investigating
authorities became to ensure that their determination of likelihood of recurrence
or continuation of dumping and injury rests on a suﬃcient factual basis that allows
the investigating authority to draw reasoned and adequate conclusions. The AB, in
30 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 106–107; Appellate
Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 87.
31 Appellate Body Report, on US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 359.
32 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 280. Also see
Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 7.117.
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 123–124.
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its report on US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews explained its
reasoning as follows:
InUS – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body emphasized
the importance of the terms ‘determine’ and ‘review’ in Article 11.3, stating:
The words ‘review’ and ‘determine’ in Article 11.3 suggest that authorities con-
ducting a sunset review must act with an appropriate degree of diligence and arrive
at a reasoned conclusion on the basis of information gathered as part of a process of
reconsideration and examination. (emphasis added)
The Appellate Body also endorsed that Panel’s description of the obligation
contained in Article 11.3, which description the Appellate Body found ‘closely
resemble[d]’ its own understanding:
The requirement to make a ‘determination’ concerning likelihood therefore pre-
cludes an investigating authority from simply assuming that likelihood exists. In
order to continue the imposition of the measure after the expiry of the ﬁve-year
application period, it is clear that the investigating authority has to determine, on
the basis of positive evidence, that termination of the duty is likely to lead to con-
tinuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. An investigating authority must have
a suﬃcient factual basis to allow it to draw reasoned and adequate conclusions
concerning the likelihood of such continuation or recurrence. (emphasis added;
original footnotes omitted)
The plain meaning of the terms ‘review’ and ‘determine’ in Article 11.3, therefore,
compel an investigating authority in a sunset review to undertake an examination,
on the basis of positive evidence, of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
dumping and injury. In drawing conclusions from that examination, the in-
vestigating authority must arrive at a reasoned determination resting on a suﬃcient
factual basis ; it may not rely on assumptions or conjecture.34
It is clear that suddenly the AB showed a great willingness to read a lot into two
words. It imposed some important basic disciplines on sunset reviews. While we
welcome in general such a development, we cannot help wondering why a similar
approach in favor of importing some of the disciplines in terms of dumping and
injury was rejected. To read such obligations into words as ‘determination’ and
‘review’ is not more textual than it would have been to do the same for dumping
and injury. In other words, if one wanted to be consistent, the only solution would
be to say that there simply are no disciplines imposed by the text of Article 11.3
and that the drafters had been sloppy by not cross-referencing the obligations that
apply in original investigations.
At the same time, and in light of the lack of any serious economic justiﬁcation
for the use of anti-dumping, we do not want to be seen as suggesting that we
disagree with the introduction of such disciplines by the AB. While consistency is
certainly a virtue, one can also be consistently wrong. We should thus be happy
with this lack of consistency by the AB in its approach to sunset reviews, which
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, paras. 179–180.
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were starting to look very much like an empty box. At least the box is not com-
pletely empty now.
How full it is remains to be seen. While a requirement is introduced to base the
determination on facts and positive evidence, a sunset review is by deﬁnition a
forward-looking exercise. Even the AB thus admitted that some speculation about
future events cannot be avoided.35 Moreover, the demands on the type of evidence
on which the determination is to be based are minimal. Limited observations, in the
sense of small volume of export sales, might suﬃce for the purposes of conducting
a lawful review.36 More importantly, data that were evaluated in the original
investigation may be used again and reevaluated at the review stage as ‘a fresh
determination, based on credible evidence’.37 This implies that it may be justiﬁed
to base a sunset determination of likely dumping on data from more than ﬁve years
ago. At ﬁrst glance, this seems troublesome. A prospective analysis as the one
allegedly undertaken in a sunset review (i.e., will there be likely dumping and
injury in case the duty is removed?) should be based on the most recent data, it
would seem. One could argue that a prospective analysis based on data from more
than ﬁve years ago can hardly be called meaningful. However, as we discuss in
more detail below in the economics section, more recent data are not necessarily
more relevant for the likelihood determination given that the data being used for
comparison would be derived from a set of historical market conditions (under
the order) that we anticipate would be quite diﬀerent from the future market
conditions (were the order to be removed).
Moreover, while the basic due-process rights applicable in original investiga-
tions have been applied to sunset reviews, the AB accepted one important excep-
tion: in sunset reviews, no individual determination of the need to maintain the
duty with respect to the individual exporter is required.38 This of course has the
important consequence that a company can remain subject to an anti-dumping
order even though it is no longer dumping. Its sales will continue to be monitored
and remain under threat of anti-dumping action for another ﬁve years. But how
can this be squared with the insistence on the need to have a suﬃcient factual basis
for maintaining the duties ; dumping is a practice of individual companies, it is not
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 341.
36 Appellate Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 346:
We endorse the Panel’s view that ‘[t]he simple fact that the number of price comparisons was
limited does not make this aspect of the USITC’s determination inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the
[Anti-Dumping Agreement] ’,
Also see Panel Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 7.303.
37 Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 88.
38 In its report on US – Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Sunset Review, the AB considered that
paragraph 10 of Article 6, requiring the authority to calculate individual margins of dumping cannot apply
in a review because, according to the Appellate Body, in a review, an authority is not required under
Article 11.3 to calculate dumping margins in the ﬁrst place. Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion
Resistant Steel Sunset Reviews, para. 155.
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something countries engage in. Yet, if the facts support a determination that one or
more exporters are likely to continue or restart dumping, all exporters remain
subject to anti-dumping duties. The sunset review may well be based on facts
in such circumstances, simply not necessarily on facts relevant to the exporter
allegedly engaged in dumping. How does all this ﬁt together? Only the AB knows.
Causation – required to keep the duty in place?
Dumping, injury, and the existence of causal link between the two are the basic
conditions for any anti-dumping action. If there is no dumping, no duty may be
imposed to oﬀer protection to a domestic industry, even though it may be faring
badly and could be said to be suﬀering ‘injury’. Similarly, if imports are being
dumped on the market, but the domestic industry in the importing country is
healthy and proﬁtable, no duties may be imposed, since the industry is not in a
state of ‘ injury’. Likewise, imports may be dumped into a country, and during that
same period of time the domestic industry may be going through a diﬃcult period
of loss of proﬁtability and lay-oﬀs, but still no protection can be oﬀered through
the imposition of anti-dumping duties unless it can be demonstrated that the
dumped imports are the cause of this negative situation. The causation require-
ment thus plays an important role in preventing countries from passing on to
exporting countries the costs of bad industrial management, lack of adequate
investment in new technology, and a failed industrial policy in general.
In the case discussed in more detail in this report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Oil Country Tubular Goods, the Appellate Body conﬁrmed, on the one hand,
that a causal link between dumping and injury to the domestic industry is funda-
mental to the imposition and maintenance of an anti-dumping duty under the
AD Agreement. However, on the other hand, and in line with the alleged textual
approach outlined above, it also stressed the fact that the text of Article 11.3 does
not require the establishment of a causal link between the likely injury and the
likely dumping. It held the view that a sunset review is a distinct process with a
‘diﬀerent’ purpose from the original investigation, and that therefore a causal link
between dumping and injury is not ‘required to be established anew in a review
conducted under Article 11.3’.39 According to the Appellate Body, ‘adding such a
requirement [of establishing a causal link between the likely dumping and likely
injury] would have the eﬀect of converting the sunset review into an original
investigation, which cannot be justiﬁed’.40
The Appellate Body considered that the nexus to be demonstrated under Article
11.3 is not between dumping and injury, but between ‘the expiry of the duty’ on
the one hand, and the likelihood of ‘continuation or recurrence of dumping and
injury’ on the other hand.
39 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 118.
40 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, para. 123.
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However, to conclude on this basis that there is no need to establish a causal link
between the likely future dumping and injury seems problematic to say the least. In
our view, an examination of likelihood of recurrence or continuation of injury
must refer to likelihood of injury insofar as it is caused by dumping, and not just
any injury. Even under a strict textual approach, the Appellate Body erred by
introducing such an artiﬁcial separation between injury and causation, since
the only relevant injury under the AD Agreement is the injury caused by the
dumped imports. Look at the text of the AD Agreement: injury and causation are
both discussed in the same provision, Article 3 of the AD Agreement, entitled,
Determination of Injury. So, there is no separate provision dealing with causation.
While the requirement to establish a causal relationship between dumping and
injury is expressed in one paragraph of Article 3, Article 3.5 AD Agreement, this is
not the only paragraph of Article 3 linking injury to the dumped imports. Various
other paragraphs of Article 3 such as for example Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, refer to
the volume of dumped imports and the eﬀects of such imports on domestic prices
as well as the impact of these imports on domestic producers. In other words, such
provisions do not simply set forth an analysis of the state of the domestic industry
as such, quite to the contrary. They are all geared at establishing the existence of
injury caused by dumped imports.41 In our view, the Appellate Body’s textual
arguments separating injury from causation are misplaced, and its interpretation is
not faithful to the text of the AD Agreement.
This being said, two additional comments are in place to put this error in the
right perspective.
First, in practice, we wonder whether the Appellate Body’s error will have much
impact, as it seems that the AB was not willing to accept the consequences of its
own ruling. It appears that a causation requirement was brought in through the
back door: the need to establish a nexus between the termination of the duty and
the likely dumping and injury that would follow.
Since it must be demonstrated on the basis of positive evidence that there exists
a nexus between the expiry of the duty and the recurrence or continuation of
dumping and injury, an investigating authority cannot simply ignore the inter-
vening eﬀect of an inﬂux of imports from other sources, or an event such as a storm
destroying a factory for example. The injury may continue, but it has nothing to do
with the expiry of the duty, rather it is caused by an intervening factor, the non-
subject imports, or the storm. In other words, it needs to be established that the
expiry of the duty, which assumingly was protecting the industry from injury by
41 For example, Article 3.2 requires that it be examined whether there has been an increase in the
volume of dumped imports. This is part of the ‘ injury’ analysis, even though the volume of dumped
imports is not informative of the state of the domestic industry as such. It is important in establishing the
link between dumped imports and the injurious state of the domestic industry. In other words, an exam-
ination of the volume of dumped imports and their price eﬀects are elements of a causation analysis, rather
than an injury analysis pur sang. So, the relevant injury of the AD Agreement is a qualiﬁed ‘injury caused
by’ dumped imports.
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oﬀsetting the dumping, is the cause of the recurring dumping and injury. If a storm
or nondumped imports are the cause of the industry’s problems, then the expiry of
the duty cannot be blamed for such recurrent injury. Indirectly, therefore, the
requirement of a nexus between the expiry of the duty and the likely dumping and
injury imposes the establishment of a nexus between the dumped imports and the
injury. So maybe the Appellate Body’s sweeping statements about the absence of
the need to establish a causal link between dumping and injury in sunset reviews
is much ado about nothing (‘Mucho ruido, pocas nueces’, as the Mexicans
would say).
This, of course, begs the question why the AB felt it was necessary to adopt such
an overly restrictive and incorrect textual interpretation of the requirements of
Article 11.3 and the term ‘injury’ in particular. The only explanation we can come
up with is a fear of imposing disciplines and obligations on investigating auth-
orities beyond what a strict, minimalist, and therefore incorrect reading of the text
allows for.
A second comment is that, as we discuss in more detail below in the economic
analysis section, it is not straightforward to establish an empirically and econ-
omically satisfactory causal relationship between future dumping and future
injury. While that may be so, we note that it was not for such sound economic
reasons that the AB concluded that causation was not an element to be established
in a sunset review determination. Neither do we wish to suggest by this economic
comment that the diﬃculty of establishing such a causal link would be a good
reason for allowing the continuation of duties without further ado, quite to the
contrary. The fact that it is diﬃcult to come to any meaningful conclusion about
such future events should be a reason for requiring termination of such measures.
Any extension can only be based on speculation.
The SPB – the impossible task of demonstrating a violation
The Sunset Policy Bulletin (SPB) saga continued in this case. We recall that this
was the third case to deal with the US Sunset Policy Bulletin, the ins and outs of
which have been explained in the ALI report dealing with the dispute on US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews. In essence, the SPB sets forth the
USDOC’s policy for determining whether dumping is likely to continue or recur
when the anti-dumping duty expires. It provides for three factual scenarios
centered around two criteria: import volumes and dumping margins. In case the
facts are consistent with any of these scenarios, the SPB provides that the USDOC
‘will normally’ conclude that there is a likelihood that the exporters will continue
or resume dumping their products into the importing country. A number of WTO
Members have taken issue with the SPB as it sets forth certain basic assumptions
on the basis of which the USDOC will reach its conclusions without regard to
other evidence rebutting the validity of such assumptions. It was therefore argued
to be inconsistent with the basic principle that a determination and review be
based on facts and positive evidence, not assumptions.
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The ﬁrst Panel to deal with the consistency of the SPB in US – Corrosion
Resistant Steel Sunset Review (DS 244) considered that the SPB was not a man-
datory piece of legislation and concluded that, for that reason, it did not constitute
a ‘measure’ that could be challenged through WTO dispute settlement proceed-
ings. The AB overturned this decision stating that any act attributable to the State
can be challenged as such before the WTO. It did not pronounce itself on the
consistency of the SPB. A second Panel dealing with the SPB in US – Oil Country
Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews followed the AB’s jurisprudence and examined the
SPB to ﬁnd that it was inconsistent with the AD Agreement. But, this Panel, too,
was overturned by the AB. The Panel’s straightforward conclusion of incon-
sistency was based on consistent results of 232 aﬃrmative sunset determinations
all applying the three scenarios. The Panel was overturned by the AB because it
failed to conduct a ‘qualitative assessment’ of the evidence and relied on ‘mere
statistical ’ evidence. The US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Mexico case discussed in our report was thus the third case to deal
with the SPB. The Panel was clearly aware of the errors committed by previous
Panels, as it recalled the ‘guidance’ of the Appellate Body in terms of the legal
standard for determining whether the SPB was inconsistent with the Agreement
and the type of qualitative assessment a Panel is to undertake in order to establish
any inconsistency based on the evidence before it. And yet, once again, the Panel
got it wrong. At least, according to the AB.
We do not want to dwell on the comments of the AB with respect to the speciﬁc
analysis of the Panel in this case. But we cannot but wonder why the Appellate
Body wants to fault the Panel for not having examined in detail 206 of the 232
cases that were decided in an ‘expedited’ manner. After all, these were all cases
decided on the basis of the US waiver provisions that the same AB in US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews found to be inconsistent with the AD
Agreement’s requirement that a determination of likelihood of dumping and injury
be based on positive evidence and not just on assumptions. If these determinations
were all inconsistent with the AD Agreement and not based on evidence or
arguments provided by the investigated exporters, why would the Panel have
needed to examine these cases in more detail?
In any case, what we want to highlight is how diﬃcult it is to demonstrate a
violation in case the text of the legal instrument is prima facie discretionary, such
as is the case of the SPB. The SPB provides that the USDOC ‘will normally’ reach
its conclusion on the basis of the three scenarios, but allows parties to present, if
good cause is shown, other evidence rebutting the presumptive conclusions
reached on the basis of the scenarios. What the 232 aﬃrmative determinations of
the USDOC revealed, however, was how illusory such a possibility proved to be, as
every determination had been based on one of the scenarios. But what the AB
wanted was proof that evidence undermining the assumptions established under
any of the three scenarios was oﬀered by an interested party, that such evidence
was rejected, and that it was rejected because the USDOC felt obliged by the SPB
United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods 287
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745607003576
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
to reach its conclusion on the basis of one of the three scenarios. Only then would
it be possible to conclude that the SPB mandated WTO inconsistent action, only
then would the SPB be inconsistent ‘as such’ with the AD Agreement. This is of
course a Herculean task.
It is doubtful whether the AB would have reached the same conclusions with
respect to the evidence of a consistent application of the three scenarios estab-
lishing a presumption of likelihood of dumping had there not been an SPB. In other
words, had the USDOC practice been examined as such, i.e. as a ‘practice’, the
outcome would most probably have been diﬀerent. It is clear that the fact that the
USDOC always applies the three scenarios and has never to date been willing to
accept data and arguments that did not fall inside the scope of these three factual
scenarios should be suﬃcient to establish a violation. The zeroing case law and the
way the zeroing ‘methodology’ was considered to be an ‘as such’ violation of
the requirements of the AD Agreement stands in stark contrast with the overly
rigorous mandatory/discretionary approach advocated in this case. Given the
importance of sunset reviews as the door to an extension of the duty for another
ﬁve years, and given the acknowledgment by the AB itself that termination of
a duty after ﬁve years is the rule, and extension the exception, this deferential
approach is all the more surprising and disappointing.42
It is for reasons of predictability and a stable trading regime that GATT/WTO
jurisprudence allows challenges of laws on an ‘as such’ basis, thus even without
the application of such laws, and without a need to wait for the damage caused by
such legislative violations to occur. The direct impact of trade laws was an im-
portant consideration in allowing such ‘as such’ challenges. By denying Members
a realistic possibility to challenge such quasi-discretionary measures as the SPB,
the AB is undermining the objective pursued by such ‘as such’ challenges. Each
Member will be forced to challenge the actual application of the SPB, although it is
clear that USDOC will always base itself on these doubtful and overly simplistic
assumptions, discarding alternative evidence.
This hard line is even more surprising in this particular case in light of the clear
criticism expressed by the AB with respect to the assumptions underlying the three
scenarios. The AB objected to the presumptions established under these three
scenarios as being a suﬃcient basis for making aﬃrmative determinations. It
considered that there were certain cases where the presumption was quite forceful,
but that for other scenarios the presumption was more doubtful. According to the
AB, for example, a company’s strategy and ability to increase or decrease its
42 So, after ﬁrst having overturned the ﬁrst Panel for not wanting to consider the possible violation
contained in the SPB because it did not mandate any action, the AB has now de facto closed the circle
making it clear that you may well be allowed to challenge such discretionary legislation ‘as such’, but you
will never win the case. The evidentiary burden on a complainant is such that legislation that does not
expressis verbis require WTO inconsistent action will never be found to be inconsistent as such with the
WTO Agreement. The ﬁrst Panel was right after all : let’s not waste each other’s time, this is a no-go from
the beginning.
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exports to particular markets would need to be examined to be able to say any-
thing about the future likelihood of dumping to stimulate an increase in imports.
It would require an examination of a variety of market conditions, such as, in
particular, the opportunities available in diﬀerent markets and the competitive
conditions in the marketplace.43 The USDOC never does such a thing but simply
examines whether the facts of the case are covered by one of the three scenarios.
If that is the case, it concludes that there is a likelihood of dumping. USDOC does
not question the underlying assumptions.
In sum, it appears that many US sunset review determinations could be
challenged before the WTO since all are based on the presumptions established by
the SPB, yet the SPB itself remains untouchable. This is obviously not a desirable
outcome.
We want to add one ﬁnal systemic comment. The SPB saga demonstrates once
again that the AB fails to introduce the expected predictability and uniformity in
the dispute settlement process and does not clarify the legal obligations of the
Agreement. Two Panels, both very much aware of what the Appellate Body had
said in respect of the SPB and both expressly relying on the AB’s statements in this
respect, were overturned for having failed to correctly apply the Appellate Body’s
guidelines. Were both Panels too ignorant to understand what the AB was saying,
or was the AB too vague in explaining what it considered to be required, and
overly zealous in imposing respect for its own statements? We leave this to the
reader to decide.
Economic analysis
This section provides an economic analysis of two key aspects of the Appellate
Body’s decision. First, we examine a role for causality between expected dumping
and expected injury in the sunset review investigative process. Second, we provide
an economic assessment of the use of cumulation in the likelihood-of-injury
determination in the sunset review process. After addressing these issues in each of
the next two sections, in the ﬁnal section we return to the question of the economic
importance of sunset reviews more broadly.44
Causation in sunset reviews
A key question at issue in the appeal is whether investigative authorities in the
sunset review process are required to establish the existence of a causal link be-
tween likely dumping and likely injury. Before commencing our economic analysis
of this question, we ﬁrst review two foundational issues – what an economic
43 AB Report, US – OCTG Mexico, paras. 198–200. In fact, the scenarios are such that it will not be
too diﬃcult to reach aﬃrmative determinations, which explains perhaps the fact that, unless the domestic
industry was no longer interested in maintaining the order, every sunset review conducted by the USDOC
has led to an aﬃrmative ﬁnding.
44 There are a number of other economic issues associated with dumping involved in this dispute and
decision that we choose not to address, given their substantial treatment in other contributions to this
series.
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analysis contributes vis-a`-vis the question of how investigative authorities ﬁrst
make the likelihood-of-dumping determination during a sunset review; and how
economics assesses the importance of causality in anti-dumping investigations
more generally. After reviewing these issues separately, we then tie together our
analysis below.
Likelihood of continued or renewed dumping. When examining the question of
whether it is likely that a foreign ﬁrm will continue or renew its dumping if
an anti-dumping order were removed, we ﬁrst review the insightful analysis of
Howse and Staiger (2006). A concise summary of their fundamental reasoning is
simply that ‘a meaningful assessment of the likelihood of continued or renewed
dumping requires an understanding of two things: (i) what conditions led to
dumping in the ﬁrst place; and (ii) whether those conditions have changed in a
way that removes the original reason for dumping’ (Howse and Staiger, 53).
With this statement, we highlight the fact that Howse and Staiger rule out an
alternative methodology – which is that the likelihood of dumping determination
be based on evidence from pricing data and dumping calculations collected while
the anti-dumping order was imposed.
Howse and Staiger rule out this (prima facie) attractive alternative by pointing
out that evidence that a ﬁrm dumped while under an anti-dumping order is not
necessarily a useful predictor of whether the ﬁrm would also dump in the absence
of a such an order – i.e., in the sunset review scenario that the anti-dumping order
would be removed. Blonigen and Park (2004) provide a theoretical framework
and supportive economic evidence based on the behavior of ﬁrms under US anti-
dumping orders that serves as a compelling explanation for the Howse and Staiger
argument. Because the USDOC carries out its dumping determination retro-
spectively, i.e., by examining past dumping behavior, Blonigen and Park show
how this can create a (counterintuitive) incentive for proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms to
increase their dumping margins because of the presence of an anti-dumping order.
Blonigen and Park not only illustrate this incentive within a theoretical economic
model, but they also provide empirical evidence from a sample of pricing decisions
made by ﬁrms under US anti-dumping orders that is consistent with the theoretical
model’s predictions.
The economics of causality in anti-dumping investigations. Before examining
the question of causality in the speciﬁc setting of sunset reviews, we provide a
brief discussion of the importance of the causality issue within the more general
context of the link between dumping and injury.
While there may be evidence of dumping and evidence of injury to the domestic
industry in an anti-dumping investigation, economists argue for the need for a
causal link because of concern that other more compelling factors may have con-
tributed to ‘causing’ the injury. For example, at the same time that dumping takes
place, the domestic industry may face other economic shocks unrelated to dumped
subject imports. Examples of such other factors include ‘supply-side’ shocks such
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as cost shocks due to unexpected changes in energy prices or other key inputs, labor
shortages (strikes), poor managerial decisions, or natural disasters ; ‘demand-side’
shocks such as ﬂuctuations in income or tastes and preferences; or even shocks to
the level of nonsubject imports.
Because of the presence of many theoretically compelling, and yet potentially
competing explanations of the cause of injury to a domestic industry, economists
have developed formal, empirically based methodological frameworks that
investigative authorities can use to help sort between explanations. Two such
examples are an econometric approach and a simulation approach.
A typical econometric approach to examine the causality question would have
investigators use a multivariate regression analysis to examine the statistical re-
lationship between movements in recent values of possible competing explanatory
variables (e.g. subject imports, energy or other input prices, nonsubject imports,
etc.) and movements in recent values of measures of industry injury (e.g. proﬁts,
revenues, employment, capacity utilization, etc.).45 There are a number of reasons
why, if there are no other constraints, the econometric approach can be the most
compelling. For example, it is the most rigorous approach, as a properly speciﬁed
regression framework allows the investigator to use data stemming from actual
events to estimate how much of the injury is due to dumped imports, controlling
for a number of other potential explanations for the injury. The drawback of this
approach is that frequently there are realistic constraints to implementation, such
as the fact that it may diﬃcult or costly because it is very data intensive.
An alternative methodological framework that economists have developed to
provide insight into the causation question is called a ‘simulation’ approach. The
basic methodology is to use estimates of key economic parameters (e.g. demand,
supply, and substitution elasticities) of the product market under investigation in
combination with minimal data on changes in a few key market indicators (e.g.
prices, domestic production, volume of subject and nonsubject imports, etc.) in
order to come up with a rough, but economic-based assessment as to whether
dumped imports are at least statistically a cause of injury.46 While such simulation
exercises rely heavily on assumptions of the model’s market structure and the
reliability of elasticity assumptions obtained from other sources, and they do not
provide as much information as a multivariate regression analysis, such an ap-
proach can be an attractive and low-cost alternative useful for examining whether
the basic economic facts are consistent with a scenario in which dumped imports
contributed to injury. Indeed, such an alternative may be particularly appealing
45 See, for example, the approach of Prusa and Sharp (2001), as well as the discussion in Durling and
McCullough (2004). Similarly motivated regression-based approaches to the related framework of asses-
sing the relationship between imports and injury in safeguards law can be found in Grossman (1986) and
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1987).
46 Economists at the USITC have developed such a model, frequently referred to as the COMPAS
model (Francois and Hall, 1993). For applying a similar approach to related injury and import causality
linkage cases in safeguard cases, see also Kelly (1988) and Irwin (2003).
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when a more reliable though formal regression analysis is extremely diﬃcult,
perhaps because of lack of suﬃciently disaggregated time series of data. This
constraint is frequent when the scope of the investigation involves a few narrowly
deﬁned product categories and/or the period of investigation is a short time series.
The causal link in sunset reviews. In this section, we examine whether econ-
omist’s arguments for the importance of a causal assessment, as well as the
economic techniques to assess causality in anti-dumping investigations, more
generally also apply to the case of likely dumping and likely injury determi-
nations in sunset reviews.
The primary diﬀerence between the causation link in the injury-determination
decision and one in a sunset review is that the latter is an assessment made
prospectively. A sunset review decision is based on expectations of future cir-
cumstances relating two issues – the expected future pricing behavior of foreign
ﬁrms and the expected future economic performance of the domestic industry in
the presence of such expected foreign pricing behavior.
Because of the prospective nature of the assessment that is made in a sunset
review, a regression-based analytical approach is not a useful exercise to assess the
causality between any likely future dumping and any likely future injury. While the
economic reasoning is quite intuitive, we do note that our arguments should not be
misinterpreted as a statement condemning causation as a necessary component to
anti-dumping more generally. It is simply that in the case of a sunset review, ex-
pected future market structure (e.g. number of competitors, degree of competition
in the market, response of consumers) once the anti-dumping order is removed is
an unknown, and this market structure is likely to be quite diﬀerent from the
market structure that exists empirically in the historical data that would be derived
from a recent period during which an anti-dumping order was in place. Thus, even
if a suﬃciently disaggregated and long-time series of data were available (the usual
constraint that can make even a desirable regression analysis impractical), drawing
inference from such historical data derived from the period in which the order was
in place is unlikely to accurately predict ‘out of sample’, future economic out-
comes under conditions in which the anti-dumping order would not be in place.47
Would the alternative of an empirically based simulation approach be a
useful exercise? Applying a simulation model could reveal useful insight as to the
likelihood of future injury conditional on the likelihood of future dumping. Note,
however, that use of such a model again requires information on a number of key
parameters associated with expected future market outcomes – i.e., what would
the demand, supply, and substitution elasticities ‘ look like’ if the order were
removed? Ultimately, an investigator would need to make an educated guess as to
the size of these elasticities in a future state of the world and would therefore have
47 Indeed, this is one explanation for why Moore (2006) found little empirical relationship between
traditional industry measures of injury (computed under the years of the order) and ITC sunset review
injury decisions in the United States.
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to confront the question of whether market conditions have changed from the
most ‘comparable’ state of the world. This is likely the state of the world prior to
the anti-dumping order being in place.
This economic analysis ultimately leads us back to an analogy to the original
sunset review insight provided by Howse and Staiger, here applied to this follow-
up issue of injury and causality, i.e. that a meaningful assessment of the likelihood
of continued or renewed injury caused by likely dumped imports requires an
understanding of at least two things: (i) what were the causes of injury in the ﬁrst
place; and (ii) whether the conditions surrounding these factors have changed in a
way that removes them as likely future causes of injury.
Cumulation in sunset reviews
Our second area of economic analysis addresses the question of an anti-dumping
investigator’s use of cumulated imports in the sunset review injury determination.
The fundamental economic concern with the discretionary use of cumulation
is that investigators may face the incentive to use it strategically in order to
‘manipulate’ decisions – e.g. ﬁnding evidence of likely continued or renewed
injury when there would not otherwise be such evidence.
The basic economic problem with cumulation is that its presence creates the
possibility that one exporter’s decision has ‘externality ’ implications on other
ﬁrms in an anti-dumping investigation.Whenever an exporter does not face the full
cost or beneﬁt of the actions it takes, the result is that its decisionmaking leads to
distortions and outcomes that are ineﬃcient. In the presence of such externalities,
economists have noted that it creates an incentive to ‘free ride’.48
Howse and Staiger (2006) examine a related issue of economic incentives
aﬀected by free-riding in the context of an anti-dumping investigator being con-
fronted with the choice of calculating dumping on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc basis versus an
order-wide basis. They argue that if the likelihood of dumping depends import-
antly on factors that are under the control of speciﬁc companies (e.g. technology
choices, input costs) as opposed to factors that are common across ﬁrms (e.g.
exchange-rate movements) then the analysis should be done on the company-
speciﬁc basis. The intuition is that if margins are calculated order-wide, this can
lead to free-riding behavior and ultimately ineﬃcient outcomes. If a company’s
behavior aﬀects the likelihood that its competitors will have an anti-dumping duty
imposed or removed, then because the company does not face the full cost or
beneﬁt of its actions, it may decide to set prices or make other related choices that
are ineﬃcient. On the other hand, if the company knows that the decisions it
makes only aﬀect its own dumping margin (because the anti-dumping investigator
has adopted a rule of calculating dumping on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc basis), all externalities
are internalized, and there is no concern that this will lead to free-riding.
48 This assumes that the sunset review process would otherwise itself yield an eﬃcient outcome.We do
not address the broader possibility that the sunset review process itself is ineﬃcient.
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The question of whether or not to allow for cumulation in an injury determi-
nation creates a similar set of economic concerns over free-riding. Just as exporters
may change their pricing behavior away from what is individually optimal in
recognition that such behavior will aﬀect the dumping decisions that are being
made with respect to their competitors (e.g. if using the ‘order-wide’ method),
exporters may also change their behavior away from what is individually optimal
if they anticipate that their actions inﬂuence the injury determinations facing their
competitors (e.g. if a cumulation rule is allowed).
If cumulation is left at the discretion of investigators at the sunset review stage,
government authorities with a particular ‘bias’ (for or against domestic industry)
will make the decision of whether to cumulate strategically to inﬂuence their
ex ante preferred outcome. One concern is that investigators will have an incentive
to cumulate multiple countries into their likelihood of continued or renewed injury
determination simply because this increases the probability of free-riding on the
part of each individual investigated country. For example, such a decision to
cumulate in a sunset review may increase the probability that each individual
exporter underinvests in its legal defense to have the order removed, as it does not
stand to capture the full beneﬁt of its litigation eﬀorts. Furthermore, the exporter’s
decision not to adequately defend itself is undertaken in anticipation of the ability
to ‘free ride’ on other exporters’ legal defense, since the injury determination is
likely to be cumulated. But since all exporters face this underinvestment incentive,
too little is cumulatively spent on the legal defense. The lack of an adequately
funded legal defense may lead authorities to use the prejudicial ‘best information
available ’ (BIA) in their ultimate injury determination, and the result is that the
order is more likely to remain in place.
This concern over free-riding and the cumulation rule in injury determinations
in anti-dumping investigations is supported by the ﬁndings of economic research.
Early research on US and EU anti-dumping investigations documented a curious
and unexplained ‘superadditivity’ eﬀect in cases in which investigators cumulated
imports. The empirically documented superadditivity eﬀect is that the probability
of a positive injury ﬁnding is higher when the number of defendants in the case is
larger, holding constant their total market share.49 Gupta and Panagariya (2006)
provide a simple economic model to explain the empirically documented super-
additivity eﬀect. The Gupta and Panagariya explanation is that the larger is the
number of exporters involved in the investigation, the smaller the incentive for
each exporter to invest in its own defense, because there are positive externalities
to them winning the case and not having a duty imposed.50 Thus, the incentive of
49 For evidence on US cases, see Hansen and Prusa (1996); for evidence of the impact of cumulation in
EU cases, see Tharaka, Greenaway, and Tharakan (1998).
50 A complementary explanation that Gupta and Panagariya attribute to Robert Staiger at the end of
their paper, is that cumulation may have a super-additive impact on injury ﬁndings if the probability of a
positive ﬁnding rises with the size of the dumping margin. Speciﬁcally, their explanation is that ‘ [c]eteris
paribus, the larger the number of ﬁrms exporting to the country in which dumping takes place the more
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each exporter to ‘free ride’ leads to a smaller-than-optimal cumulative eﬀort
in putting up a legal defense, thus increasing the likelihood of a positive injury
determination.
The economic intuition from cumulation, free-riding, and anti-dumping
investigations extends to expected injury determinations in sunset reviews as well.
Furthermore, exporters might not only have an incentive to free ride in sunset
reviews, but certain exporters may have an incentive to try and (perversely)
increase the probability of a continued or renewed likelihood of injury in the
presence of cumulation, so that an anti-dumping order remains in place across
numerous foreign competitors.
As one example to see the incentives behind this phenomenon, suppose
that during the lengthy period that the anti-dumping order had been in eﬀect,
a ﬁrm that was originally simply an exporter had established a subsidiary within
the investigating market, e.g. what is referred to as ‘anti-dumping-jumping’
foreign direct investment (FDI). Blonigen and Ohno (1998) present a model
where the possibility of anti-dumping-jumping FDI creates incentives for foreign
ﬁrms to act strategically vis-a`-vis their other foreign competitors (e.g. increase
dumping, causing injury) in anticipation of being able to subvert the anti-
dumping order by becoming a ‘domestic ’ producer through FDI. Because of
cumulation, their actions will adversely aﬀect other exporters, and the possibility
of the FDI alternative also means that they will experience less of a consequence
of their strategic actions if in the future much of their sales stem from local sub-
sidiaries.
Furthermore, a second example could arise even without the need for FDI
simply because of the discriminatory nature of the anti-dumping orders imposed.
An important factor aﬀecting an individual exporter’s behavioral decision is the
relative levels of anti-dumping orders that have been imposed. If an exporter’s
primary competition comes from other exporting ﬁrms, there are other potential
scenarios in which even an exporter under an anti-dumping order may prefer the
status quo of continued orders for all exporters relative to having all anti-dumping
orders removed, as would be the case in a successful sunset review. Suppose the
exporter has an extremely low margin, relative to the other foreign competitors,
and that the domestic industry is either capacity-constrained or perhaps has even
exited the market since the original order was imposed.
The overall implication is that even in sunset reviews, the cumulation rule allows
for one ﬁrm’s decisions to have substantial externality implications for other ﬁrms.
This, in turn, leads to ineﬃcient outcomes. A way to eliminate this ineﬃciency is
to have ﬁrms internalize the implications of their decision, an outcome that is
intense competition is and hence the lower the price there is. As long as this does not impact the price
charged by the exporting ﬁrms in their domestic markets, we will observe a larger dumping margin and
hence larger probability of positive ﬁnding’ (Gupta and Panagariya, 2006: 163).
United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods 295
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745607003576
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:39:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
more likely if anti-dumping investigators are not allowed to cumulate imports in
expected injury sunset review determinations.
Do sunset reviews matter?
In this section, we provide a brief economic comment on the question of whether
sunset reviews matter for the duration of imposed anti-dumping measures. Cadot,
de Melo, and Tumurchudur (2007) empirically investigate a number of questions
relating to sunset reviews. One of their results is that the change that has mandated
sunset reviews during the WTO period has led to a stronger ﬁve-year cycle for the
duration of anti-dumping measures, relative to the GATT period, during which
there was no mandatory sunset review process.
Nevertheless, the authors present ﬁndings that there is still substantial hetero-
geneity in the duration of imposed anti-dumping measures across countries. For
example, they ﬁnd that the United States seems to have failed to comply with the
spirit of the sunset review process, as it has continued to extend the duration of
imposed anti-dumping measures beyond the ﬁve-year initial period. For a number
of other countries, they ﬁnd a higher likelihood of terminating measures after a
sunset review at the ﬁve-year point. Nevertheless, even for these countries, the
apparent evidence is that this action is undertaken ‘voluntarily’, i.e. it is not
necessarily caused by the sunset review provisions of the ADA.51 The implication is
that such countries might have done so anyway, even if it were not mandated by
the WTO agreements – thus, it is still an open question as to whether the manda-
tory sunset reviews have had an eﬀect on the duration of imposed anti-dumping
measures.
4. Conclusion
Two conclusions can be drawn from this case : First, the AD Agreement, as inter-
preted by the Appellate Body in this and other similar cases, imposes only minimal
disciplines of a general nature on Members wishing to extend the anti-dumping
measure beyond its original ﬁve-year period. This is problematic, as it seems to
void much practical meaning from the rule that says that anti-dumping measures
are to be terminated after ﬁve years. The very deferential approach towards sunset
reviews taken by the Appellate Body is diﬃcult to reconcile with its own statement
that termination of a measure is the rule, and continuation the exception. That is
certainly not true in the US. Yet, for ‘textual ’ reasons, the Appellate Body has
rejected almost all claims against the US laws and regulations that provide the
framework for the US approach. As we tried to demonstrate in this paper, this
‘textual ’ argument is weak and has resulted in undermining the practical eﬀect of,
what was considered to be, one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round
51 This analysis is based on evidence that there seems to be little diﬀerence in howWTOmembers treat
antidumping targets that are other WTO members (treatment group) versus targets that are WTO non-
members (control group) in sunset reviews.
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Anti-Dumping Agreement: limiting the life span of an anti-dumping measure to
ﬁve years.
Second, from an economic perspective, it seems that Panels and the Appellate
Body are simply debating the wrong type of questions. The prospective nature of
the analysis that is to be performed in a sunset review raises particular questions
in terms of the data to be used; it requires an overall approach that is diﬀerent
from the approach in an original investigation, which is retrospective in nature.
Questions such as why exporters engaged in dumping in the ﬁrst place, and what
the conditions of the industry were so that the dumped imports were able to cause
injury in the ﬁrst place are important questions that are not answered in an original
investigation. The answers to these questions are important however, as they could
form the basis for a more meaningful prospective sunset analysis. At the moment,
sunset reviews seem adrift as Panels and the Appellate Body fail to give guidance
to Members on how to do a more economically sound and informed review.
Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to sunset reviews, but is an inherent
problem of the AD Agreement, and the use of anti-dumping as a trade policy
instrument more generally.
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